The Problem with PDSA in healthcare

In healthcare it is now generally understood that using the PDSA cycle is a good and valid method to try to achieve improvement. The PDSA is very widely known in healthcare and often used, though it is thought it ought to be used even more. Yet, when we look at health organisations that are using the PDSA we do not find the improvement at a range or scale or impact that is very often found in other industries who use PDSA.

Why?

To resolve the angst around this we need to know what comes before and after any particular individual PDSA cycle.

Before a PDSA

How is the specific individual PDSA cycle conceived? Why was this particular PDSA chosen over many possible PDSAs that could have been done?

Before choosing to do any one particular PDSA there are at least five prior major detailed outlining steps to be completed that involves objective and subjective methods, data analysis, prioritisation, setting aims, measures and interventions. Only after this a PDSA ought to be done by a very small team which has mostly understood the prior steps as a matter of overall context – i.e. the how and the why, the logic that validates your activity, the reason that requires your engagement and the rationale that demands your time and energy.

If you are currently doing a PDSA or soon planning to do a PDSA it is important for you to consider how it was chosen. If you chose it out of an impulse, hunch, suggestion, obligation, instruction that is great for your personal learning of the tool which is of course very important. It may (or may not) show an improvement on that particular cycle or cycles, but you or your organisation should not be under the illusion that this PDSA effort is going to contribute to sustained or widespread improvement. It is important to prove to yourself on where the PDSA fits in within a broader department, division, directorate, organisation context.

One of the ways to identify whether there is any link to anywhere other than to you is to observe if your boss or your boss’ boss is as keen and enthusiastic about your PDSA not because they support you but because your PDSA has an important link to moving the dots in the right direction that they are supposed to move and they can prove it. They should be able to stop further PDSAs that is not working and you should be happy with it.

After a PDSA

What happens to your PDSA after you have completed and you think it shows some positive result? Are you in a position to pilot it further in repeatedly larger areas/scales? Do you have the support for it? Have your bosses confirmed your PDSA cycles have proved as shown by a series of linked organisation wide data that it has led to wider improvement? Eventually after a series of such PDSAs does your intervention, process and outcome become official standard protocol for the area?

The problem with PDSAs as we do it in healthcare right now

Every empowered person does PDSA based improvement activity but there is usually no one to track all of these, guide the people doing PDSA projects, help them do the run or SPC charts, identify where these projects are in the overall organisational improvement effort (say by using a driver diagram), capture and roll out good ideas for the whole organisation's benefit.
I would say that we should stop healthcare employees from doing unsupported PDSAs for at least two reasons a) it wastes individual staff time which could be usefully spent on something more useful b) if the unsupported PDSAs are successful then it leads to small individual areas shining which is usually a drain on resources and general emotion (technically known as sub-optimisation). In theory it is possible to even cause harm by such poorly designed activity.

The issue is Tools vs Philosophy

PDSA has great history and comes from the times of superior masters like Shewhart Juran and Deming. It is a part of an overall philosophy that can be called the QI movement or which after adaptation now more familiarly known as the ‘Lean’ (though some purists, even non-purists will be able to differentiate between the two).

To understand this better, we need to ask ourselves whether the PDSA is used as a tool for individuals or as a part of a philosophy for organisations. Similar to the issue whether Lean is used as a method or philosophy. If you or your organisation are using PDSA (or Lean) as a mere tool or a method – you are designing is poor and destined to fail.

We are at a point in history of improvement healthcare that we are training a large number of people on ‘quality improvement’ and letting them do unsupported PDSAs. We do that under the guise that we do not want to interfere with the freedom of senior and experienced healthcare staff. When these ‘trained’ ‘senior’ people do not see the improvement that the lean system claims that it offers, they then become committed disbelievers in the philosophy while at the same time being obliged to follow the tools and the methods.

We are at the risk of defiling and debunking a well established validated healthcare improvement philosophy because of our unwillingness to adopt it as a philosophy. It will be to the eternal shame of us in healthcare. We are creating proof that lean healthcare does not work, instead of accepting that we do not know how to do lean healthcare properly and we are not doing it as we are supposed to do. We need to act swiftly to avoid this - there is life and limb at risk.

  

©M HEMADRI 

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My Conversation with Dr Ravindran, Chairman of Aravind Eye Care

I had the privilege of meeting Dr Ravindran, Ophthalmologist and Chairman of Aravind Eye Hospitals, India, at the International Forum for Quality and Safety in Healthcare London 2013. I had a general informal conversation but it was of course an eye opener - you bet he has experience in that!

I share some of the conversation here. 

Clinicians' Selection processes at Aravind

Doctors

It is well known that Aravind has processes that are followed really well by the staff, especially doctors who work there. Protocols and processes are very important for their pathways and systems to work. It is also well known in healthcare that it is very difficult to get doctors to follow organisational protocols. I asked Dr Ravindran on how they do that.

Aravind appoints doctors after a 3 day selection process. Applicant to appointment ratio is a minimum of 3:1. Fellows and residents work and spend time with staff on those three days. Doctors then provide feedback to the appointments panel on the suitability of applicants. Anyone blackballed by existing staff are not selected. The main if not the only criteria for appointment is if the doctor is 'suitable for our culture and basic values'.

They obviously get people who are already high flyers with research credentials, publications, etc but Aravind's attitude seems to be that they want only normal average people to work with them and their system and culture will then make them do good work. (This sounds very similar to Toyota Chairman Cho's statement that they get brilliant results from average/normal people when other car manufacturers get average results from brilliant people). These high flyers, if they are not suitable for the Aravind culture are told that they are likely to be very successful outside the Aravind systems.

Chairman Ravindran says 'we want everyone to be pleasant and professional to each other. If we detect even a small amount of arrogance during the selection process, we will not appoint the person. Arrogant people can offend and upset others which will disrupt team work and increase staff turnover - we cannot have that'.

Nurses

Student Nurses are selected after a written test and an interview. The test is a hand written test where they answer a question on a social concept. Hand writing is thought to be important (if you cannot read a person's writing the value of their documentation and written communication becomes a future problem). As for the content, it is thought that if a young aspiring nurse cannot write with genuine empathy about a socially important issue they would not fit in with Aravind's culture and communication.

Now comes the interesting part of the process. While interviewing the applicants is what everyone does anyway, Aravind interviews the parents of the applicants. They see this as very important. Attitudes of parents and aspects from home have an influence on how people behave and work. This is accounted for in the interview and selection process.

Once they are selected to be nursing students, Aravind pays for their training, accommodation etc. These students after graduation get to work for Aravind.

I probed their thinking - I said that the society will have many different types of people and their organisation will/should have different type of people; including and excluding some types will not reflect the society. Dr Ravindran was very clear with his answer, he said that of course the society  will have many types of people but in his organisation they only want the type of persons who can share their basic value.

Their basic value is compassion.
 

He also said that many in the organisation including the senior people continue to engage with the staff and their lives, he said 'I know a lot about many people who work with us, what they enjoy, what problems they have at work, what issues they have outside work and in general a lot about their lives. Due to this we are able to support them very early.'

Learning

I specifically asked him about where and whom he and his organisation learns from. He says that their main learning is from within their organisation, they try to improve everyday and share it with their internal colleagues -  mutual learning within the organisation. (This blog has in a previous post stated this as the fourth fundamental condition if healthcare is to be successful http://successinhealthcare.blogspot.co.uk/2012/01/hemadris-four-fundamental-questions-for.html )

No external consultant has even been contracted. No lean specialist, no management consultant. They get regular visitors trying to learn from the Aravind system. Aravind staff do visit hospitals around the world to explore what might be suitable for adaptation.

Attitudes

When asked about how they deal with the high volume of patients Dr Ravindran said 'If we have more patients we simply start early - all of us. We do not put patients on a waiting list, we do not turn patients away'.

I asked about being lean and quick and his response was 'It is not about being quick. It is the attitude of not wasting anything. So if we don't waste time it looks like we are quick. We do not throw away anything; if a bed sheet is torn you can be sure it will re-appear in some other form to help with some other function'.

I think my commentary is not really needed as the conversation is very illuminating and self-explanatory. Their website shows that eight out of ten directors of their board are doctors - does that say something? I think we can learn a great many things from Aravind Eye Care and their practices. I wonder what we can actually adapt and use for healthcare delivery in the western world?

©M HEMADRI 

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Links

Aravind Eye Care http://www.aravind.org/

Human Error: Does not exist

Human Error. Does it really exist?

We have discussed wrong site surgery/procedure (http://successinhealthcare.blogspot.co.uk/2012/10/mark-site-campaign.html)

The equivalent for this in histopathology would probably be labeling errors. Labeling errors could at the best lead to rework/reprocess and at the worst result in wrong report with potentially catastrophic effects on patients which can be as grim as wrong site surgery. In most laboratories there are multiple checking steps within the process to detect errors and prevent them leading to errors in reports that could harm patients. In a busy pathology laboratory in England in 2007 there were 113 slide and block labeling errors. By 2009 after a series of Kaizen events it dropped down to just 2 labeling errors which would be a 98% improvement giving a short term six sigma score of 5.8.

 What is interesting are the results of the root cause analysis of the 113 pre-Kaizen. Most of them showed that human error as one of the root causes. What is remarkable was the post-Kaizen improvement was achieved with the same people. The root cause analysis of the 2 post-Kaizen errors showed further opportunities for system improvement.

If system improvement can reduce or eliminate (well, nearly eliminate in this example) human errors, the immediate logical obvious question to ask is 'Does human error exist?'

Deming says that 80% of quality problems are caused by management and 20% by employees. It is further thought that since the employees are essentially a part of a system for which the management is responsible, almost all quality problems are caused by management. Deming seems to have taken the view that the focus and emphasis on quality has to be top down and the creation and delivery of quality should be bottom up.

There are a number of areas where zero errors or quality problems (or virtually zero errors) are possible. In the same pathology lab the number of endoscopic biopsy request clarifications (which used to happen due to doctors illegible handwriting) are now down to zero since the lab started asking for a copy of the printed endoscopy report to accompany the specimen. Previously it was thought that poor handwriting and not putting enough information was a part of human error due to human fallibility, in practice it caused arguments, distress and wasted time.

We are now beginning to question whether there is anything called human error at all. As realists and practical professionals we realise that there will be some areas where perhaps human error does exist and possibly cannot be avoided but we believe that for people working within well organised systems this should be a rare thing. We wonder if people with poor training and no experience in quality methods who nonetheless think they are capable of understanding quality improvement are unable to analyse with an aim of system improvement and hence blame human error as a reason by default. After all everyone has recognition and sympathy for the phrase 'to err is human'

We are having an emerging view that 'Human Error' as an attribution for quality problems is a cop out clause used by poor managers and weak leadership. It need not be so. However it requires managers and leaders to shoulder the responsibility for building continuous quality improvement into their work and the way their teams function. CQI systems are already available and they have to be applied with patience and persistence - those who do that will find  the path of continuous improvement and will eventually share this view of ours that 'Human Errors does not exist in organised systems' though it may sound very radical right now.

M Hemadri & David Clark

Co-authors

David Clark is a Consultant Pathologist and National Clinical Lead, NHS Improvement. David's thoughts expressed in this blog post are his own personal views.

PS: Regular readers of this blog would have read a previous post about how we find designs which set us up for failure (not deliberately) and we then blame it on 'human error' http://successinhealthcare.blogspot.co.uk/2012/12/blame-it-on-human-error.html

©M HEMADRI 

Follow me on twitter @HemadriTweets

My mini e-book 'Standardised Management Conversation' is available - click http://www.amazon.co.uk/Standardised-Management-Conversation-Hemadri-ebook/dp/B018AWBJTU 
till 31 December 2016 all my earnings from the sale of this book will be donated to charity  http://successinhealthcare.blogspot.co.uk/2015/11/standardised-management-conversation.html

 

Biggest Lean Deployment in the World

The American Army has the largest lean six sigma deployed in the world.

The American army budget is currently more than $240billion
The US Army has deployed Lean since 2006 and saved $19.1 billion dollars
so far. In 2011 alone they are conducting 2111 lean improvement projects
to save $3.6 billion.
They have 5700 green belts, 2400 Black Belts and 175 Master Black Belts
and 48 Lean Deployment Directors. Their return on these investments have
been very good.

Most of the projects have been about logistics but their health care is
also heavily into lean. They have seen great successes.

Here is an interesting anecdote from one of their early projects -
obviously dated but the learning value is undiminished.

According to the principles of lean six sigma, US Army Medical Command
looked into high volume areas, 'waste' and 'customer satisfaction'
problems and found that they had:

The largest army call centre with more than 10000 calls per week
Low customer satisfaction at 68%
Average wait time of 3.14 minutes (wait is one of the classic wastes in
lean)
Call abandon rate of 26% - with a peak time call abandon rate of 49%

Obviously they found this very unsatisfactory and ran a lean project to
improve this. And they improved:

Average wait time reduced to 33 seconds (a six-fold improvement)
Call abandon rate reduced to 3% with peak time call abandon rate down to 22%
Call volume reduced 20% due to less call backs
and so on

These results were far better than the aims they set themselves for the
projects

Apparently the customer satisfaction got worse!!

While people were getting their calls attended in record time they could
not get appointments to see doctors in clinics because the clinics had
capacity and scheduling problems - so the issue was, what is the point
in answering the phone quickly if they could not address the real need
which is patients to see doctors quickly.

Do not despair!

They have since addressed that issue and that has had an even bigger
effect on their call centre

The average waiting time has fallen to 3 seconds (yes, you read it right
THREE seconds - from their starting point of 3 minutes and 14 seconds)!!

There are two messages, a) system wide thinking is difficult but very
important b) it is even more important to solve the real issue (rather
than what is immediately apparent).

HEMADRI

Note: The above is written from my recollection and notes of a brilliant presentation made at the WCBF Lean Six Sigma in healthcare conference 2011; with thanks to the presenters from the US Army Health Command and their collaborators.